This essay explores how changing the subject can function as a valid legal process in classical rabbinic literature. In order to do so, it first establishes standard rabbinic legal procedure, in which the legal reasoning for arguments is debated and either supported or refuted. Next, it discusses cases that do not fit this pattern: namely, those in which a rabbi, faced with a contradictory or complex argument, changes the subject rather than his reasoning or ruling. Through a discussion of such cases, this essay argues that, while not preferable, changing the subject can in fact be a valid rabbinic legal process.
1 Whether Churchill ever uttered these words is unclear. For a discussion that concludes that he probably did repeat, though did not coin, this phrase, see: http://quoteinvestigator .com/2014/02/01/fanatic/ (accessed on 16 July 2014).
The rabbinic corpus carefully records these debates. Further, the editors of these documents are interested in both preserving dissenting and minority positions (which, as in other legal systems, are preserved for the purposes of making additional legal rulings)5 and in inciting even more debate where at first there might have been more consensus. In short, the rabbinic corpus is marked by rabbinic legal give and take (or in Aramaic šaqlā ' we-ṭaryā') . This (sometimes contrived) dialogue is a defining feature of rabbinic legal process.6
It is thus quite common to encounter rabbis arguing over the halakhic justification for a given legal decision. As such, there are standard rules for this legal process and technical terminology by which it is described.7 For example, if a rabbi's argument is either proven false or a better interpretation/reason is found, he can simply retract (from the Hebrew root ḥzr or the Aramaic root hdr) his previous statement.8 Sometimes a retraction can occur for less than 5 See M. Ed. 1:5; B. Eruv. 13b (where both opinions are "the words of the Living God," though one is preferred); Martin S. Jaffee, 39b-40a; 66a; 111a; 118b (where we learn that R. Yose never had to retract anything he ever said!); B. Eruv. 14b; 47b; 52a; 101b; B. Pes. 17b-18a (which debates whether a rabbi did, in fact, retract; cf. B. Bes. 18b); 29a-b; 39a; 117b; B. Suk. 27a; B. Hag. 4a (conjectural retractions); B. B.M. 64b-65a; B. Hor. 2a and passim; Pes. Rab. 23/24:2 (which I include because, although I mainly reference the Mishnah and, to a larger extent, the Babylonian Talmud herein, it is worth noting that this concept appears throughout the classical rabbinic corpus); also see B. Ber. 40a, in which students ask a rabbi who appears to act in a contradictory manner to his own ruling whether he has retracted (hadar) his ruling, only to find out that the details of the case at hand differed, so his earlier ruling still stood. Sometimes a rabbi chooses not to retract his opinion, and instead either he or the editors offer logical reasons for maintaining his position (See, e.g., B. Eruv. 38b-39a; B. Pes. 40a). One can retract foolish (indeed, heretical statements, as well; e.g., M. San. 7:10). Retractions can also occur with slightly different wording pious reasons, as in M. Ed. 5:6-7, where a rabbi is offered political office in exchange for retracting a legal ruling. The rabbi refuses until he is on his deathbed, at which time he instructs his son to retract his opinion, since "it is better to leave the opinion of the individual and to hold to the opinion of the majority."9 As the rabbi's advice to his son indicates, retracting a legal opinion for a variety of reasons (social, legal, economic, political, etc.) Nid. 36b-37a; and on-rhetorically, at least-retracting after death, see T. Oh. 4:2 [quoted on B. Naz. 52b]). In this case, "the individual" is the soon-to-be-deceased father and "the majority" are those who disagree with him. In another case, rabbis consider whether to abrogate (lehapēr) the ruling of a deceased rabbi; ultimately, they decide to allow his ruling to stand (see B. Eruv. 41a). However, since this essay is about individual rabbis and the legal process associated with their own legal rulings, I generally will not deal with cases in which rabbis assess, correct, nullify, etc. the rulings of other authorities, except where it has bearing on a case where a rabbi has the option to either argue for, nuance, alter, or retract his ruling, so as to place into relief the very few instances in which a rabbi chooses instead to change the subject rather than his ruling. 10 In Y. Yev. 10:4 (11a), a rabbi is threatened with being labeled a "rebellious elder" if he does not retract his ruling. However, we are not told whether he did, in fact, retract in the face of this threat. On this text, see Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, It should also be noted that rabbis cannot always convince one another of an opposing view. In this case, the rabbis tend to agree to disagree and therefore the text leaves the argument in unresolved tension.11 Sometimes, the editor will make a comment about the unresolved nature of the halakhic dispute. Examples of such editorial comments include:12 "There is nothing more (to say about this topic)";13 "Let (the matter) remain (unresolved)";14 and "It is a difficulty!"15 Other times, the editor will comment about which of the opinions he deems to be evident.16 In these instances, the editor is either leaving a dispute unresolved, noting that the resolution remains elusive, or briefly glossing an otherwise unresolved argument.
In [ša'nê] . There the case is X, but here the case is Y" (e.g., B. Ber. 42a). Such a statement establishes a distinction that allows multiple authorities/sources to be correct. Finally, if the logic of a statement attributed to another rabbi does not seem to work, the editor (or another rabbi) might suggest that the statement be reversed ('îpûḵ and variations thereof; e.g., B. Eruv. 38b; on the multiple ways in which a reversal [√'pk] can work, including multiple references to such instances, see Sokoloff, Dictionary, p. 156). 17 The same comment I made in n. 12 applies here, as well. 18 See, e.g., B. Shab. 53a; 72a; 80b; 130b; B. Eruv. 37b; 103a; B. Pes. 28a; 34a (in regard to multiple authorities); B. Sukkah 7a; 10b (which questions whether the fact that rabbis shut up indicates that they have retracted their opinion); B. Bes. 6a; 37b; B. Yev. 57a (wherein after shutting up, an authority answers another question, which he answers; I do not consider this tantamount to changing the subject, however, since he is asked another question by another authority rather than actively moving on to another topic himself); B. Ned. 77a-b (which, via a play on words, questions whether a rabbi shut up ['îštîq] (nistaleq), leaving the argument in aporia.19 In such instances, the argument remains unresolved. Now that we have seen how, when faced with an alternative argument, legal decisions can be retracted or simply left unresolved by the rabbis, we are ready to examine an anomalous case: one in which a rabbi chooses to change the subject rather than admit defeat. Such instances are exceedingly rare, as I have only been able to find two examples throughout the classical rabbinic corpus.20 I argue that these cases teach us that changing the subject can be a validthough perhaps not a preferable-rabbinic legal process and can be used to make a subtle rhetorical point or even just to avoid participation in a given argument.
The first instance of this phenomenon is found amidst a rabbinic conversation about the permissibility of cheese made by a non-Jew. This is a significant discussion because the rabbis introduce innovative food legislation that expands well beyond what is commanded in the Hebrew Bible.21 The rabbis must somehow justify these regulations. Sometimes, these new justifications are rejected and the law is changed.22 But in one instance, the law is neither justified nor changed. What is changed, however, is the topic.
[A] R. Judah said: R. Ishmael inquired of R. Joshua when they were walking along the road: A reason is offered for this prohibition (in unit C), but that reason is easily refuted (D). As a result, R. Joshua retracts his rationale (F). Note that he does not retract his ruling, only his legal reasoning.31 R. Joshua then offers another possible explanation for this rabbinic prohibition, which is also parried quite easily. Rather than retract either the ruling or the reasoning again, R. Joshua does something rather odd: he changes the subject (H)! I leave aside the technical matter of the interpretation of the biblical verse.32 Rather, what matters for my discussion is that, given the chance of retracting-an action that he has already taken-a rabbi chooses to change the subject rather than change his ruling.
While the Talmud provides various reasons for this change of subject, some scholars have argued that, by changing the subject, R. Joshua makes a subtle argument: he tacitly suggests that one should not question the rational basis for these laws.33 Thus, by changing the subject, R. Joshua is accepting the ruling, but rejecting the need to rationalize it.34 It is about choosing love for God over gentile cheese, the verse implies, though the reason why this food regulation demonstrates love for the divine is far from clear. Changing the subject here thus serves to answer the general question of why gentile cheese is prohibited while, at the same time, it deflects attention from the fact that the answer itself lacks rational justification. The scholarly argument can be found in Gvaryahu (citing Naeh; see above, n. 30), "New Reading," pp. 210-211. 34 In my current book project (in progress), I argue that the earliest group of rabbis, the Tannaim (the group to which these rabbis belong), justify biblical food laws on the grounds of revelation, not reason. Therefore, this opinion accords with their overall opinion on such matters.
The second example is found in the midst of a complicated debate about the impurity conveyed by the marrowbone of a carrion animal.35 Does such a bone impart impurity just from physical contact or also from being carried ("by carriage"), regardless of whether one actually touches the bone itself? At the center of this complex discussion, the following narrative appears: 35 There is a parallel to this text in B. Bes. 21a. Though the subject of the debate is different, the mechanism for changing the subject is the same, as are the rabbis (though in the latter it is R. Huna and not Rabbah bar R. Huna), so I will only discuss one text and will note this parallel. 36 Rabbah bar R. Huna's name is consistent neither in the manuscripts nor in the parallel text. 37 Since the marrowbone is closed, none of its marrow can leak out, which would affect the status of the person who touched the bone. On these laws, see, e.g., M. Hul. 9:5 (and commentaries on this and on 9:4, of which our present text is one). 38 Some manuscripts add "by carriage." As will be discussed below, this is the same R. Ishmael that we encountered in our previous text. The view that is being inquired about is found in M. Hul. 9:4 (which is the mishnah upon which this gemara comments). 39 Some manuscripts omit clause C. 40 The view suggested in C-D is a quote that appears anonymously in M. Hul. 9:5. 41 This refers to an earlier argument made by R. Ishmael, not cited in the text above, that two half-olive's bulk of carrion meat combine together to form an olive's bulk, which constitutes the minimum amount necessary to convey impurity (in this case, by carriage but not by contact, as discussed in M. Hul. 9:4). 42 In regard to a closed marrowbone, one would never touch the marrow (see above, n. 37), whereas one who touches "from the front" of a bone would touch pieces of meat that might add up to an olive's bulk. 43 I.e., that contact is necessary to convey impurity, in which case even a closed marrowbone would do so.
[ Once again, I am more interested in the ending than the technical discussion at hand. What is of particular interest appears in section G: faced with a difficult question, a rabbi chooses not only to change the subject but to do so by pointing to a raven that happens to be flying through the air!48 When his son 44 Some manuscripts omit "from Pumbedita." Pumbedita was a Babylonian town famous for its renowned rabbinic academy (cp. Cambridge in England and New England). 45 In B. Ber. 43b, Rav Papa uses a quote he attributes to Rava to justify an act that is not in accordance with halakhah. However, the editor immediately alerts the reader that Rava never said this and that Rav Papa invents a tradition as an excuse for his incorrect actions. , 1994 [1950] ), pp. 172-177 (who calls them "raven-scarers"). Since this is a discussion about impurity, this might explain why the raven was the bird that "flew" by at that precise moment. Ravens also appear in the midst of other purity discussions elsewhere (e.g., B. Nid. 4b; B. Bek. 10b). Additionally, the sudden appearance of a raven (to be more specific, "an Egyptian raven") is used to solve a halakhic taxonomic question in Gen. Rab. 65:3 (ed. Theodor and Albeck 714). Flying birds appear in at least asks him why he does this (H), his response (I) is one with which any teacher can sympathize: I am too tired and hungry to answer such a difficult question. It is worth taking a moment to unpack this response. First of all, the text is not saying that an answer is impossible to provide; rather, it claims that it is too complicated for a tired and hungry rabbi to elucidate. Second, once again a quotation from the biblical book Song of Songs is used as part of the change of subject. Perhaps the erotic nature of Song of Songs is deployed like a magician utilizes misdirection: to distract the audience from the trick. Only, in this instance, it is the subject that disappears into thin air and not a (non-kosher) rabbit. Ultimately, I am not sure what to make of this, but it is worthy to note. Third, this excuse seems to be accepted by the audience. Legal exposition should occur neither without proper rest nor on an empty stomach. In the absence of both, one can excuse oneself from justifying one's opinion, even if it seems to be disrespectful to a colleague (H-I).49
Taken together, what do we learn from these texts? Though standard rabbinic legal process allows one either to retract one's opinion or to leave the argument unresolved, in at least two cases a rabbi chooses an alternative option: he changes the subject. In the first case, the change of subject can be read as a subtle argument against the need to justify food prohibitions-a view that accords with trends encountered elsewhere in contemporaneous rabbinic documents.50 In the second case, the change of subject allows a rabbi to avoid having to provide a complicated answer on an empty stomach and without two other, potentially relevant, rabbinic contexts. First, elsewhere another rabbi is praised for being so holy and consumed with his studies that, if a bird flew overhead while he was engaged in study, the bird would be burned immediately (see B. Suk. 28a). I do not believe that this text is necessarily in play here, although it would contrast the tired, hungry, and distracted rabbi of our text with the all-consumed focus of the rabbi in the latter text. Second, M. Sot. 6:1 addresses the case in which a jealous husband hears of his wife's infidelity (and hence her impurity) via a flying bird. Although one might (rather tortuously) attempt to connect these texts through the fact that impurity is discussed in both, the context of the latter is about overhearing gossip (for which the flying bird is a metaphor) about an unfaithful wife (whom, if you want to push the metaphor really far, has flown the coop), and not about a flying bird that changes the subject in media res.
On a personal note, this story reminds me of a trick that my uncle often uses: if a family discussion becomes tense or argumentative, he shouts, "Oh look! A puppy!" as a way to distract everyone. That used to make me laugh, and now it helps me learn about rabbinic legal procedure! 49 Throughout the rabbinic corpus, the rabbis hold in high esteem the need to treat one another with respect even in the face of heated legal debate. For example, see the famous case about the Oven of Akhnai found in B. B.M. 59a-59b. 50 See above, n. 34.
proper rest. While there are some commonalities, I am not sure that we can draw too strong of conclusions from these two instances. Is Song of Songs cited because it is such an erotic love book that it might distract a rabbi from halakhic debate? This is possible, though serious discussion of Song of Songs appears elsewhere and it is not understood to be distracting.51 Are R. Ishmael's opinions so annoying that it is easier to change the subject when debating with him than to deal with the questions he raises? If this were the case, why, of the numerous passages in which R. Ishmael and other rabbinic authorities disagree,52 are these the only two that end in this manner? And what do we do with statements elsewhere in rabbinic literature such as "the general custom is to follow R. Ishmael"?53 Rather, I would argue that we learn from these cases that changing the subject can be a valid-though not a preferable-rabbinic legal process, one that might serve to make a subtle rhetorical point or simply to avoid an argument one would rather not have (at least at that time). They also remind us of the limits of reason, as sometimes revelation must suffice as an answer, and other times one is simply too tired to argue.
The fact that this is a valid legal process does not mean that this is a preferable rhetorical strategy. Note, for example, that Rava takes his father Rabbah bar R. Huna to task for seemingly disrespecting R. Avya the Elder. While Rabbah bar R. Huna's answer provides an excuse, it does not claim that Rava was wrong to questions his father's actions towards "a great man." As in other cases in which a rabbi's actions are technically kosher but not in accord with best practices,54 this indicates that changing the subject is allowable but not ideal. This understanding goes a long way towards explaining the rarity of this practice: we should not be surprised to only rarely find evidence for a legal strategy that is undesirable, though licit.
This essay focused on instances in which a rabbi explicitly changed the subject during a halakhic debate. There are many instances in which a rabbi perhaps implicitly changes the subject.55 While I found a myriad of such cases while researching this article, it was often hard to decide whether such instances actually amounted to changing the subject. Given the potential ambiguities of such texts, I decided to focus on unambiguous examples of changing the subject. Now that we have established that this is a valid (though not preferable) legal process in rabbinic literature, we can read other potential instances with this possibility in mind. Further, one could cite the myriad of times that the anonymous redactors of the Talmud use their editorial privilege to interject tangential comments, whole arguments, narrative twists, etc.56 I decided to exclude these manifold examples (indeed, one could find examples of this on nearly every page of the Talmud!) because they strike me as a different phenomenon. Such interjections are the work of a heavy-handed redactor, who is sifting and winnowing every sugya in order to frame arguments and to highlight (or conceal) certain traditions, legal rulings, etc.57 They are not explicit changes of the subject in the middle of an argument (real or imagined) between two rabbis, but rather they are implicit pushes (and sometimes shoves) in another narrative direction via the (not always so invisible) hand of the editor(s).
Having explored texts in which rabbis explicitly change the subject in the midst of legal discourse, we learn that, whether turning to grammar or a raven, such actions-albeit rare and by no means preferable-can be justifiable.58 
